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1 Introduction
In the last couple of decades, behavioral economics successfully challenged and enriched
the traditional neoclassical analysis of individual behavior. This success is conrmed by a
massive number of empirical and experimental studies that show how some of these behav-
ioral contributions rationalize regularities that were previously labeled as puzzles. Nowadays
terms such as inequity aversion, hyperbolic discounting, reference dependent prefer-
ences and self-serving bias belong to the vocabulary of many economists and there is
little doubt that the phenomena indicated by these words do actually a¤ect human behavior
in many di¤erent contexts.
Acknowledging their importance at an individual level, one should also consider the
e¤ects that these same phenomena may have on the collectivity. In particular it seems
interesting to study the social welfare and policy implications that these kinds of behavioral
preferences may have with respect to the standard neoclassical preferences paradigm. The
idea is that if behavioral models provide a better description of human behavior vis-à-vis
traditional models, then welfare analysis must be retuned on these new forms of preferences
as this can lead to a more realistic picture and to the implementation of more accurate
policies. Some recent papers already proceed in this direction. For instance, ODonoghue
and Rabin (2006) investigate the issue of optimal taxation on sin goods (such as unhealthy
food) when some consumers su¤er from self-control problems as captured by time preferences
based on quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In an analogous framework, Gruber and Koszegi
(2001 and 2004) study how taxes can counteract individualsaddiction to cigarettes. Other
papers (ODonoghue and Rabin, 2001, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Choi et al., 2003) consider
various forms of paternalistictaxation on various kinds of goods.1
While sharing a similar approach, this paper does not study the issue of optimal taxation
but focuses instead on a di¤erent problem of welfare economics, the problem of a benevo-
lent social planner who must allocate a scarce, homogeneous and perfectly divisible resource
1Bernheim and Rangel (2005) provide a detailed overview of this recent literature about behavioral welfare
analysis, focusing especially on problems involving saving, addiction and public goods.
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among a nite number of claimants. Many are the possible examples for such a situation:
a parent who wants to divide a chocolate bar among her children, a boss who must share a
monetary bonus among his subordinates, a judge called to decide how to divide the belong-
ings of a divorcing couple, an organization that has to allocate humanitarian aid to di¤erent
villages hit by a natural disaster.
The paper analyzes this allocative problem under the assumption that the claimants
are characterized by various forms of behavioral preferences.2 In particular, we consider
three scenarios: the case of the claimants having inequity averse preferences (à la Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), the case of the claimants having reference dependent preferences (as for-
malized in Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) and the case in which reference dependent preferences
are combined with a self-serving bias (discussed for instance in Babcock et al., 1995). This
last case is particularly interesting. On one hand, it captures situations that are very likely
to arise and whose welfare/policy implications are unusual and remarkable. On the other
hand, by formally linking the issue of how agents set reference points with the pervasive
phenomenon of self-serving biases, it is also interesting from a methodological point of view.
This paper conveys many results. The more general lesson is that, even in this context,
behavioral preferences can have important welfare implications, as optimal allocations are
usually di¤erent with respect to the standard case with rational preferences. In the course
of the analysis we will also be able to state more specic results that answer the following
questions: if agents are inequity averse, does a social planner need to know individuals
actual preferences or shall he worry about how to dene social welfare? (The answer is no in
both cases). If individuals characterized by reference dependent preferences are self-serving
biased and a rst best solution is not achievable, is it more e¢ cient to disappoint (a little)
all the claimants or is it better to please some of them and disappoint (a lot) the remaining
ones? If the second approach is superior (as we show it to be), how should the planner
choose who to privilege? (The answer is that it does not matter). We also show how a
2The case with rational preferences has been carefully analyzed. See, among many others, Steinhaus
(1948) and Dubins and Spanier (1961), or much more recently, Brams and Taylor (1996) and Maccheroni
and Marinacci (2003).
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model of biased claimants characterized by reference dependent preferences can rationalize
the regularity of observing exceedingly high claims in litigations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formalizes the problem and
presents the traditional solution. Sections 3 considers the case in which the claimants are
inequity averse. Section 4 studies the situation in which agents are characterized by reference
dependent preferences starting with the case of agents with no self-serving bias and moving
to the case where such a bias exists. In the latter case some strategic implications and the
role of a social planner are also discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The problem and its standard solution
A social planner must allocate a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good (whose amount
we normalize to 1) among N  2 claimants. The notation x = (x1; :::; xN ) indicates a
possible allocation such that xi is the amount of the good that the planner assigns to
claimant i 2 f1; :::; Ng. Feasible allocations are the ones for which xi 2 [0; 1] for any i andP
i xi  1. Each individual i has a utility function ui (x). Notice that this formulation allows
the agents utility to depend not only on xi (as it happens with neoclassical preferences)
but possibly also on other components of the vector x (as it happens with some kinds of
behavioral preferences). In general it will be the case that @ui(x)@xi > 0 for any xi 2 [0; 1] such
that claimants do not have any feasible satiation point. The vector u = (u1 (x) ; :::; uN (x))
collects individual utilities.
The social planner wants to maximize social welfare. His objective function is given
by a social welfare function (SWF) that takes the form W (u) = W (u1 (x) ; :::; uN (x)), i.e.,
a function that aggregates individuals utilities into social utilities. We assume that the
social planner is not biased towards any particular claimant and therefore we only consider
symmetric SWFs that give equal weight to all the agents. More precisely we consider three
welfare functions: the utilitarian SWF, the maxmin SWF and what we call the fair SWF.
The utilitarian SWF has a very long tradition in welfare economics (starting with Ben-
4
tham, 1789) and prescribes that the social planner implements the allocation that maximizes
the sum of individual utilities.
 Utilitarian SWF : Wut (u) =
P
i ui (x)
At the opposite, a social planner who adopts the maxmin or Rawlsian (from Rawls, 1971)
SWF wants to maximize the welfare of the worst-o¤ individual.3
 Maxmin SWF : Wmm (u) = min fu1 (x) ; :::; uN (x)g
Finally, we introduce a function that selects the fairestavailable allocation where, in
accordance with the literature on fair divisions (see for instance Varian, 1974 or Brams and
Taylor, 1996), an allocation is called fair if it is Pareto-e¢ cient and envy-free. Envy-freeness
(as dened in Foley, 1967) means that no claimant envies the amount of the good received
by the other agents: ui (xi)  ui (xj) for any i and any j.4
 Fair SWF: Wfa (u) = 11+PiPj maxfui(xj) ui(xi);0g s.t.
P
i xi = 1
These three social welfare functions are clearly inspired by di¤erent motivations and will
in general lead to di¤erent solutions. We will indicate an optimal allocation with the vector
x^w = (x^
w
1 ; :::; x^
w
N ) where x^w = argmaxWw(u) and w 2 fut;mm; fag. In line with the
benevolent nature of the social planner, a common feature of these three optimal allocations
is that they all satisfy the Pareto principle.5 More precisely, x^ut, x^mm and x^fa are such that
3The utilitarian and the maxmin SWFs are the extremes of a family of functions captured by the so-called
generalized utilitarian SWF. This function is given by W (u) =
P
i g (ui (xi)) where g is a concave function.
The more g is concave the more the resulting allocation will be equitable (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995, or
Moulin, 2003).
4The concepts of fair division and envy-freeness have also been applied to problems that somehow di¤er
with respect to our basic framework. For instance, Tadenuma and Thompson (1995) investigate the case
where the good is indivisible while Brams et al. (2006) and DallAglio and Maccheroni (2007) consider the
case of a non-homogeneous good. Another important strand of the literature focuses on procedures (for
instance moving-knife protocols like divide and choose) whose goal is to lead to fair allocations even
when the planner does not know the claimantspreferences. See, for instance, Abreu and Sen (1990) and
Bag (1996).
5There are situations in which the social acceptability of the Pareto principle may be disputable (see for
instance Sen, 1977 and 1979, who considers the case of agents with illiberal or antisocial preferences). Still,
these criticisms do not seem to apply to our simple allocation problem, leaving the Pareto principle as a
valid objective a social planner should pursue.
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P
i x^
w
i = 1. The rst two SWFs automatically satisfy the Pareto principle given that an
agents utility is increasing in xi. The third function is forced to be Pareto optimal by the
constraint. Consider, for instance, the allocation x = (0; :::; 0). This allocation is trivially
envy-free but it does not qualify as being fair given that it is not e¢ cient.
To actually nd the optimal allocations identied by the three SWFs, one needs to know
how claimantsutility functions are dened. Traditional neoclassical analysis postulates each
agent i to have preferences that are exclusively dened on xi and that lead to continuous,
increasing and concave utility functions. More formally, ui (x) = ui (xi) with
@ui(xi)
@xi
> 0 and
@2ui(xi)
@x2i
< 0 for any i. In such a situation, the utilitarian SWF selects x^ut = (x^ut1 ; :::; x^
ut
N )
with @ui(xi)@xi jxi=x^uti  k for any i. In fact, the function Wut(u) is concave (it is the sum of
N concave functions) and is maximized by the allocation that equalizes agentsmarginal
utilities. If, on the other hand, the social planner adopts the maxmin SWF, the optimal
allocation is the one that equalizes individualsactual utilities, i.e., x^mm = (x^mm1 ; :::; x^
mm
N )
such that ui (x^mmi )   for any i. Finally, the allocation selected by the fair SWF is the one
that equalizes individualsendowments: x^fa =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

.
Alternatively, another common formulation of rational utility functions is the linear one
such that ui (x) = ui (xi),
@ui(xi)
@xi
> 0 and @
2ui(xi)
@x2i
= 0 for any i. Such a formulation can
actually be considered as an approximation of concave functions for the cases in which the
admissible range of xi (in our case the size of the pie before normalization) is small enough
to make the marginal decreases in utility negligible.6 Optimal allocations with linear utility
functions are then given by x^ut = (x^ut1 ; :::; x^
ut
N ) with x^
ut
i = 1 for the i (assumed to be unique)
such that @ui(xi)@xi >
@uj(xj)
@xj
for any j 6= i, x^mm = (x^mm1 ; :::; x^mmN ) such that ui (x^mmi )  
for any i and x^fa =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

.
Figures 1:a and 1:b provide graphical examples for the case with two claimants. In each
diagram the utility function of agent 1 is displayed from left to right. The utility of agent
2 goes from right to left. The length of the horizontal axis is xed to 1 and represents the
total amount of the good that the planner must allocate.
6Because of this, linear utility functions are often implicitly assumed in many low stakes experimental
studies about strategic interactions (Ultimatum game, Dictator game, public goods games...).
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(0,1) (1,0)
U1
U2
(0.5, 0.5)
Fig. 1.a: concave utility functions.
(0,1) (1,0)
U1
U2
(0.5, 0.5)
Fig. 1.b: linear utility functions.
Notice that, in general, the utilitarian, the maxmin and the fair SWFs lead to di¤erent
allocations. Indeed, the three welfare functions select the same allocation (namely the
egalitarian one, such that x^wi =
1
N for any i 2 f1; :::; Ng and any w 2 fut;mm; fag) only
when all the agents are perfectly symmetric. In the following sections we consider how these
results change when claimants are characterized by some kinds of behavioral preferences.
3 Inequity averse preferences
Neoclassical preferences implicitly assume that agents only care about their own payo¤
without being inuenced by the payo¤s to others in some appropriate reference group. In
other words, agents are assumed to be totally selsh. Real life evidence, as well as a large
number of experimental studies, show that this assumption often does not hold, as an agents
utility is usually a¤ected by intra-group comparisons. In the last few years various papers
modeled these kinds of social preferences.7 Particularly successful have been models of
inequity aversion(prominent examples are Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000 and Charness and Rabin, 2002). An inequity averse agent is an agent whose utility,
holding xed what he gets, decreases with the degree of inequality that arises in the reference
group. Inequity aversion therefore captures feelings such as envy (the agent gets less than
7The state of the art of these theories as well as their empirical evidence is carefully reviewed in Fehr
and Schmidt (2005).
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others) and guilt/embarrassment (the agent gets more).
In the context of our allocative problem, these issues seem to be very likely to a¤ect
an individuals ex-post assessment (and thus his utility) about the allocation implemented
by the social planner.8 Therefore, we study if and how the assumption of claimants being
inequity averse changes traditional results. More precisely, we adopt the widely used spec-
ication introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), where the utility function of individual
i 2 f1; :::; Ng is assumed to have the following form:
ui = xi   i 1
N   1
X
j 6=i
max fxj   xi; 0g   i 1
N   1
X
j 6=i
max fxi   xj ; 0g
In the original article the authors assume that i  i and that 0  i < 1. The rst
restriction implies that individuals cannot su¤er less from disadvantageous inequality than
from advantageous inequality. The second restriction rules out the existence of individuals
that would be so inequity averse that they would be willing to heavily harm themselves for
the sake of equity. Notice that these restrictions allow i and i to be equal to 0 so that
some individuals could still have (linear) purely selsh preferences.
Given that issues of equity are already embedded into individualspreferences, the fact
that optimal allocations will be strongly egalitarian is not surprising. Indeed, all three SWFs
select the symmetric allocation, such that x^ut = x^mm = x^fa =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

and ui (x) = 1N
for any i. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that this result is not a¤ected at all by the
specic values of the individual parameters i and i. In fact, a single claimant j being
strictly inequity averse (i.e., with j > 0) is su¢ cient to make the utilitarian and the maxmin
solutions collapse into the fair allocation. Proposition 1 formalizes and proves this claim.
Proposition 1 If claimants have inequity averse preferences then x^w =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

for any
w 2 fut;mm; fag and any i and i as long as there is at least one agent j such that j > 0.
8On the other hand, another important family of other regarding preferences, namely those captured
by models of intention-based reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), do not apply to
our framework where claimants simply must accept the chosen allocation and cannot reciprocate the social
planner.
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Proof. Consider the symmetric egalitarian allocation given by x^ =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

such that
Wut (u (x^)) = 1, Wmm (u (x^)) = 1N and Wfa (u (x^)) = 1. Now implement the best possible
deviation from x^: take  away from player j where j is such that j = min f1; :::; Ng and
give it to agent k where k is such that k = min f1; :::; Ng. Call this new allocation ~x.
Utilitarian welfare would now be:
Wut (u (~x)) =
P
i
 
1
N
  +  j 1
N   1 [2+ (N   2) ]| {z }
ineq. av. of j wrt k and l 6=k
 k 1
N   1 [2+ (N   2) ]| {z }
ineq. av. of k wrt j and l 6=j
 
X
l 6=j;k

l
1
N   1+ l
1
N   1

| {z }
ineq. av. of l 6=j;k wrt j and k
which simplies to: Wut (u (~x)) = 1 
"
j
N
N 1+ k
N
N 1+
P
l 6=j;k

l
1
N 1+ l
1
N 1
#
< 1
given that the terms in the square brackets cannot be negative and at least one of them
is strictly positive. Therefore, Wut (u (~x)) < Wut (u (x^)). Considering the maxmin SWF,
welfare is given by Wmm (u (~x)) = uj (~xj) = 1N     j 1N 1 [2+ (N   2) ] < 1N such that
Wmm (u (~x)) < Wmm (u (x^)). Finally ~x is not envy-free because the condition uj (~xj) =
uj (~xk) cannot be veried by valid parameters (i.e., the equality holds if j = k   1 but
this cannot happen given the constraints j > 0 and k < 1). It follows that Wfa (u (~x)) <
Wfa (u (x^)). Therefore, any deviation from the egalitarian outcome strictly decreases social
welfare under all three specications.
Proposition 1 indicates that the task of a social planner who is facing inequity averse
agents is pretty simple. In fact, the planner does not need to worry about guessing or
eliciting the parameters of individualsutility functions; indeed, he does not even have to
care about how to solve the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity in deciding which social
welfare function to adopt. By sharing the good equally among all the claimants the social
planner is sure to maximize welfare, no matter how this is dened. Figure 2 depicts the
situation with two claimants. Agent 1s utility function (solid line) goes from left to right
and it is such that 0 < 1 < 0:5. Agent 2s utility function (dashed line, from right to left)
is instead such that 0:5 < 2 < 1.
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Figure 2: inequity averse preferences.
4 Reference dependent preferences
Another important family of behavioral preferences is labeled reference dependent prefer-
ences. With respect to the standard neoclassical formulation, these preferences explicitly
acknowledge the fact that an agents perception of a given outcome may be inuenced by
its comparison with a certain reference point. This intuition goes back to the loss aversion
conjecture introduced in the classical article by Kahneman and Tversky (1979): people de-
ne gains and losses with respect to a reference point, and the negative utility associated
with a loss is higher than the positive utility associated with a gain of the same size.
A utility function that formally captures this intuition has been recently introduced
by Bowman et al. (1999) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Such a utility function can be
expressed as ui = m(xi) + (xi   ri) where, in the context of our allocative problem, xi is
a component of the vector x = (x1; :::; xN ) and indicates the amount of the good that the
social planner assigns to claimant i. The function m(xi) is a traditional utility term that
captures the direct e¤ect that the possession/consumption of xi has on total utility ui. The
function (xi  ri) is a universal gain-loss functionand reects the additional e¤ects that
perceived gains and losses (dened with respect to the individuals ex ante reference point
ri) have on ui. Notice that such a specication allows for heterogeneity in agentsreference
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points but adopts common functions for what concerns m() and (). On one hand, this
is an important restriction that we will later partly relax by considering the implications of
assuming an heterogeneous function i(). On the other hand, such a representative agent
formulation looks more realistic, as it assigns a lower informational burden to the social
planner. In fact, while it seems reasonable to assume that the planner could reasonably infer
(by eliciting or asking) individualsreference points, the task of eliciting individualsactual
functions appears to be prohibitive because of informational constraint and implementation
costs.
We now introduce and discuss a more specic functional form for the functions () and
m(). In accordance with the properties discussed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
closely following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), the gain-loss function () is assumed to satisfy
the following requirements:
A1: (xi   ri) is continuous, strictly increasing in (xi   ri) and such that (0) = 0.
A2: (xi   ri) is twice di¤erentiable with respect to xi for xi 6= ri.
A3: @
2(xi ri)
@x2i
> 0 if xi < ri and
@2(xi ri)
@x2i
< 0 if xi > ri.
A4: if x0i > xi > ri then (x
0
i   ri) + (ri   x0i) < (xi   ri) + (ri   xi).
A5: limxi!r i
@(xi ri)
@xi
= limxi!r+i
@(xi ri)
@xi
  > 1.
Some brief comments on the assumptions that look less transparent: A3 states that the
function () is convex for values of xi that are below ri (domain of losses) and concave for
values of xi that are above ri (domain of gains). It also implies that the marginal inuence
of these perceived gains and losses is decreasing. A4 means that for large absolute values
of xi the function () is more sensitive to losses than to gains. A5 implies the same result
for small values of xi: () is steeper approaching the reference point from the left (losses)
rather than from the right (gains). Taken together, these last two assumptions capture the
loss aversion phenomenon. Finally, notice that A1 implies that () is decreasing in ri; in
other words, for any given allocation xi, agent i enjoys more utility if he has a lower reference
point ri.
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For what concerns m(xi), the non-behavioral component of the utility function ui, we set
m(xi) = xi. This assumption has two important implications. First, it makes the analysis
more comparable with the inequity aversion case studied in the previous section, where
again the core part of the utility function was given by xi. Second and more importantly,
the linear form of m() implies that the properties of the function () directly translate into
equivalent properties of the utility function ui().9
We know quite a few things about the function ui = xi + (xi   ri). What we still
do not know is how an individual sets his reference point ri. This is clearly a problematic
issue to tackle, given the subjective nature of such a choice. Di¤erent individuals can set
di¤erent reference points according to what they have (in line with the traditional status quo
formulation of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), to what they expect (as proposed by Koszegi
and Rabin, 2006) or to what they think they deserve, just to name a few possibilities.
In this paper we relate the issue of how individuals set their reference points with another
widespread behavioral regularity: self-serving bias. Self-serving bias is a pervasive phenom-
enon that inuences peoples behavior in various ways. For example, individuals tend to
over-estimate their own merits, to favorably acquire and interpret information, to give bi-
ased judgments about what is fair and what is not, to inate their claims and contributions.
Research in psychology and sociology provides many nice examples of the existence of such
a bias. For instance, the overwhelming majority of subjects (Svenson, 1981, reports 93%)
declare to belong to the top 50% of drivers. More general survey studies show that more
than 50% of respondents believe they are in the top 50% of any given category. Possibly
more in line with the present paper, there is the robust nding that shows how estimates
of the two members of married couples that are asked to indicate their own contribution to
various household tasks usually sum up to more than 100% (Ross and Sicoly, 1979).
Self-serving bias can also have important economic implications. For instance, it is
considered as one of the main causes of costly impasses in bargaining and negotiations (see
Babcock et al., 1995 and Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Even if the importance of such a
9See Proposition 2 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006) for a formal statement and proof of this result.
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bias is widely acknowledged in the economic literature, a proper formalization of the concept
and the analytical study of its implications are still missing. By inserting self-serving bias
into the framework of reference dependent preferences, we think we are taking a step in this
direction.
In the context of our allocative problem, the existence of a self-serving bias is likely to
a¤ect agents reference points. In fact, everything else being equal, a self-serving biased
claimant will have the tendency to set a higher reference point with respect to a claimant
who is not biased. Consider the situation of the latter example. An unbiased agent should
set his reference points as if he were behind the veil of ignorance (for instance, before
knowing the kind of relationship he has with the planner and the other claimants or the
nature of the good). Given that the agent knows that there are N claimants (including
himself), he expects to get a fair portion of the good, i.e., ri = 1N . This implies that
reference points are mutually compatible whenever all the agents are unbiased (
P
i ri = 1).
At the opposite, self-serving biased agents will set ri > 1N . It follows that, whenever some
of the agents have such a bias, reference points are no longer compatible (
P
i ri > 1).
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In the analysis that follows, we di¤erentiate between two extreme cases. First, we study
the allocation problem in a situation where no claimant is biased. Then we analyze the
same problem under the assumption that all the claimants are biased. This second case is
particularly interesting as it captures situations that are very likely to arise and that often
have important economic implications. Think, for instance, about a divorcing couple who
cannot agree on how to share their properties given that both persons claim more than 50%.
Similarly, consider the case of heirs ghting over how to divide a bequest, or the situation
of economic partners arguing about how to share the prots of a joint venture. Whenever
reference points are not compatible and no agent is willing to concede, then no agreement
can be reached on any feasible allocation. Therefore the claimants have to ask some external
actor (a judge, an authority, or in our case, the planner) to solve their dispute.
10Notice that an individual can set ri > 1N without being biased if he actually deserves more. However, if
all the agents set ri > 1N then at least some individual is surely biased. We do not consider the less common
situation of agents displaying a self-defeating bias such that they may set ri < 1N .
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4.1 The case of agents with no self-serving bias
Agents that are not self-serving biased aim to get a fair share of the pie. Their utility
function is given by ui = xi+(xi  1N ). The solution to the planners problem is captured
by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If claimants have reference dependent preferences and no self-serving bias,
then x^w =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

for any w 2 fut;mm; fag provided that j( )j
( N 1 )
> (N   1) for any
 2  0; 1N .
Proof. The symmetric allocation x^ =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

leads toWut (u (x^)) = 1,Wmm (u (x^)) = 1N
and Wfa (u (x^)) = 1. Now consider Wut (u (~x)) and Wut (u (x)) where ~x is obtained from
x^ by taking  2  0; 1N  away from agent j and redistributing it equally to the other N   1
agents while x is obtained from x^ by taking N 1 2

0; 1N(N 1)
i
away from each of the N 1
k 6= j agents and the resulting  is reallocated to agent j. Because of the assumptions on
the gain-loss function (), ~x and x dominate all the other possible asymmetric allocations.
At ~x utilitarian welfare is Wut (u(~x)) = 1+( )+(N  1)


N 1

such that Wut (u(~x)) <
Wut (u (x^)) = 1 if and only if
j( )j
( N 1 )
> (N   1). At x welfare is Wut (u(x)) = 1 + (N  
1)

  N 1

+  () and Wut (u(x)) < 1 as (N   1)

  N 1

+ (N   1)


N 1

< 0 by
A4 and A5 and (N   1)


N 1

>  () by A3. According to maxmin welfare we have
Wmm (u (~x)) < Wmm (u (x)) given that   N 1 >   and A1. Moreover Wmm (u (x)) =
1
N   N 1 + (  N 1 ) < 1N =Wmm (u (x^)) given that (  N 1 ) < 0 and A1. Finally, under
fair welfare maximization we have Wfa (u (~x)) < Wfa (u (x)) < Wfa (u (x^)) = 1 given that
uj (~xk)  uj (~xj) > uk (xj)  uk (xk) > 0 for any k 6= j.
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Figure 3: reference dependent preferences
and no self-serving bias.
To sum up, the maxmin and fair SWFs always select x^ =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

while the utilitarian
SWF selects x^ provided that j( )j
( N 1 )
> (N   1). For any given  (), this condition is more
easily fullled when N is low. Indeed, with N = 2, it surely holds as j( )j > () by A5.
The case with two claimants is depicted in Figure 3.
Whenever x^w =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

for any w 2 fut;mm; fag, the situation may seem analogous
to the case of inequity averse individuals: the optimal allocation is the symmetric one no
matter which SWF the social planner may use. Still, notice that, with reference dependent
preferences, the utilitarian SWF selects the egalitarian outcome despite neither the planner
nor the claimants having any explicit preference for equity. In fact, it is true that claimants
are implicitly stating a preference for the egalitarian outcome by setting ri = 1N . However,
any individual i is actually indi¤erent to whether the implemented allocation is egalitarian
or not, as long as he gets xi = 1N . With respect to the inequity aversion case, agents do not
compare what they get with what the others get but with what they were expecting to get.
Notice also that the results of Proposition 2 are less general as they rely on the assumption
of agents having the same gain-loss function () and thus basically the same utility function
ui(). Allowing for heterogeneity in the gain-loss function (i.e., i()), results become less
clear-cut. The maxmin SWF always selects x^mm =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

given that this is the point at
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which claimantsutility functions intersect no matter the specic shapes of i(). Similarly,
the fair SWF keeps selecting x^fa =
 
1
N ; :::;
1
N

because this remains the only envy-free and
Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. What may change is the solution selected by the utilitarian SWF,
which can easily be asymmetric. For instance, by using the slope of the utility functions
rather than the absolute values (as in Proposition 2), if there are two agents such that
limxj!( 1N +)
@j(xj  1N )
@xj
> limxk!( 1N  )
@k(xk  1N )
@xk
then x^ut will be such that xj > 1N > xk.
Also, if limxj!(1 )
@j(xj  1N )
@xj
>
P
k limxk!(0+)
@k(xk  1N )
@xk
for any k 6= j then agent j will
be allocated the entire pie.
4.2 The case of agents with self-serving bias
In this section we analyze the widespread situation in which claimants, in setting their
reference point, su¤er from a self-serving bias. In particular we restrict the analysis to the
common case of the social planner having to allocate the good among just two agents. An
appropriate example is the one of a judge that must settle the dispute of a divorcing couple
who, because both partners are self-serving biased, cannot agree on how to split the common
belongings.11
Claimants utility function is given by ui = xi + (xi   ri) with ri > 12 for any
i 2 f1; 2g (as we did in the previous section, we will later discuss the case of i()).
Starting with the utilitarian criterion, total welfare is given by Wut(u(x)) = 1 + (x1  
r1) + (x2   r2). The optimal (internal) allocation is then dened as x^ut = (x^ut1 ; x^ut2 ) such
that @(1+(x1 r1)+(1 x1 r2))@x1
x1=x^ut1 = 0 subject to @2(1+(x1 r1)+(1 x1 r2))@x21 x1=x^ut1 < 0 ,
x^ut1 + x^
ut
2 = 1 and x^
ut
1 2 [0; 1]. Notice that the second order condition is now necessary as
the function Wut(u(x)) is not guaranteed to be concave. In fact, given that the allocation
x = (r1; r2) is unfeasible, the planner is forced to disappoint at least one of the claimants.
Because of the assumptions about the gain-loss function () (see page 11), this implies
that Wut(u(x)) is either the sum of one concave and one convex function or the sum of two
11There is quite a vast literature in sociology and psychology (see for instance Schriber et al., 1985, Gray
and Silver, 1990, and Schuutz, 1999) that shows how the existence of self-serving biases is a very important
cause of conicts and divorces in married couples.
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convex functions. In the discussion that follows we dene three intervals to which the share
of the good that the planner allocates to agent 1 can belong (see Figure 4 for a graphical
analysis). Given that the planner will certainly implement a Pareto optimal allocation, the
focus on x1 implies no loss of generality.
A) 1  r2 < x1 < r1
B) 1  r2 < r1  x1
C) x1  1  r2 < r1
(0,1) (1,0)
0.5
U1
U2
0.5
(0.5 , 0.5) r1r2
AC B
Figure 4: reference dependent preferences and
self-serving bias.
As a rst result we prove that the optimal utilitarian allocation cannot belong to the inter-
mediate interval A.
Proposition 3 If claimants have reference dependent preferences and are self-serving biased
then x^ut = (x^ut1 ; x^
ut
2 ) is such that x^
ut
1 =2 (1  r2; r1).
Proof. By contradiction. Assume x^ut1 is such that x^
ut
1 2 (1  r2; r1); i.e., x^uti < ri for both
i 2 f1; 2g. By assumption A3 about (), we know that @2(xi ri)
@x2i
xi=x^uti > 0 such that the
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functions ui() are convex at x^uti . This implies that the function Wut(u()), being the sum of
two convex functions, is also convex, which contradicts the second order necessary condition
for the maximization of Wut(u()).
Indeed, any allocation that falls in interval A is dominated in terms of utilitarian welfare
by the allocation that matches the reference point of one agent (say agent 1, i.e., x1 = r1) and
leaves the other agent as the residual claimant (x2 = 1  r1). In fact, the welfare associated
with the allocation (r1;1  r1) is given by Wut(u(r1;1  r1)) = r1 + (r1   r1) + (1  r1) +
(1   r1   r2) = 1 + (1   r1   r2). On the other hand, any allocation (~x1; 1  ~x1) with
~x1 2 (1  r2; r1) leads to Wut(u (~x1; 1  ~x1)) = 1 + (~x1   r1) + (1   ~x1   r2). Given
that  is convex in the negative orthant, we have that 1 + (~x1   r1) + (1   ~x1   r2) <
1 + (~x1   r1 + 1  ~x1   r2) where the right-hand side simplies to 1 + (1  r1   r2) such
that Wut(u (~x1; 1  ~x1)) < Wut(u(r1;1  r1)).
Therefore, from a utilitarian point of view, it is better to disappoint (a lot) an agent
(xj = 1   ri) while giving the other what he expects (xi = ri) rather than to disappoint
(a little) both claimants. The natural question is then how to decide who is the agent to
disappoint. The perhaps surprising answer (remember that r1 and r2 can be di¤erent) is
that this does not matter, as both possibilities lead to the same welfare. In fact, the welfare
associated with (1  r2; r2) is given by Wut(u(1  r2;r2)) = (1  r2) + (1  r2   r1) + r2 +
(r2  r2) = 1+(1  r2  r1) which is equivalent to Wut(u(r1;1  r1)). Such an equivalence
result remains valid for what concerns parts of the two intervals B and C. The following
proposition shows that if a utilitarian maximum falls in the smaller of the two intervals
(interval C in Figure 4), this maximum is not unique.
Proposition 4 If claimants have reference dependent preferences, are self-serving biased
and there exists x^ut = (x^ut1 ; x^
ut
2 ) such that x^
ut
1 2 [r1; r1 +min f1  r1; 1  r2g] then there
exists x^0ut = (x^
0ut
1 ; x^
0ut
2 ) with x^
0ut
i 6= x^uti and x^0uti 6= x^utj such that Wut(u(x^0ut)) =Wut(u(x^ut)).
Proof. Assume x^ut = (x^ut1 ; x^
ut
2 ) is such that x^
ut
1 2 [r1; r1 +min f1  r1; 1  r2g]. Utilitarian
welfare is given by Wut(u(x^ut)) = 1 + +(x^ut1   r1) +  (1  x^ut1   r2) where we use +()
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(resp.  ()) to indicate the positive and concave (resp. negative and convex) part of
the function (). Now dene x^0ut = (x^0ut1 ; x^0ut2 ) with x^0ut1 = 1   x^ut1 + (r1   r2) such that
x^0ut1 2 [max f0; r1   r2g ; 1  r2]. Utilitarian welfare is given by Wut(u(x^0ut)) = 1+ (x^0ut1  
r1) + 
+(1   x^0ut1   r2). By substituting x^0ut1 we get Wut(u(x^0ut)) = 1 +  (1   x^ut1 +
(r1   r2)   r1) + +(1   (1   x^ut1 + (r1   r2))   r2) which simplies to Wut(u (x^0ut)) =
1 +  (1   x^ut1   r2) + +(x^ut1   r1). Therefore Wut(u (x^0ut)) = Wut(u(x^ut)). Notice that
x^0uti 6= x^utj (i.e., 1   x^ut1 + (r1   r2) 6= 1   x^ut1 ) whenever r1 6= r2. More generally, for any
~x1 2 [r1; r1 +min f1  r1; 1  r2g] there exists an ~x01 2 [max f0; r1   r2g ; 1  r2] such that
Wut(u (~x
0)) = Wut(u(~x)); i.e., in the two intervals the function Wut() is symmetric with
respect to x = 1+(r1 r2)2 .
The utilitarian criterion can easily lead to two solutions that are very di¤erent in terms
of actual allocation of the good. In particular one allocation favors agent 1
 
x^ut1  r1 > 12

while the other favors agent 2
 
x^0ut1  1  r2 < 12

. The fact that x^0uti 6= x^utj whenever
r1 6= r2 implies that if a maximum is reached at, say, (0:7; 0:3) then the other maximum
is not identied by (0:3; 0:7); for instance, if r1 = 0:6, r2 = 0:8 and x^ut = (0:7; 0:3) then
x^0ut = (0:1; 0:9). These two allocations are equivalent in terms of welfare such that a purely
utilitarian planner should be indi¤erent between the two.12
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the only part of the unit interval in which the utilitarian
SWF could potentially identify a unique maximum is given by xi 2 (1  (rj   ri); 1] for the
i such that ri < rj . Such a maximum, if it exists, is identied by rst- and second-order
conditions, or it emerges as a corner solution if the optimal allocation is such that the entire
pie has to be given to a single agent.
To conclude the discussion of the utilitarian SWF, notice that the optimal allocation(s)
lead to a welfare that is surely smaller than 1. In fact, welfare at x^ut (where, by proposition
3, x^ut is such that x^uti  ri for only one i 2 f1; 2g) is given byWut(u (x^ut)) = 1+(x^i ri)+
12However, notice that whenever r1 6= r2, one of the two maxima (in the specic example this would be
x^ut = (0:7; 0:3)) leads to lower inequality both in endowments and in utilities with respect to the other.
Therefore, a social planner with lexicographic preferences dened over utilitarian welfare and equity would
choose the former.
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(1  x^i rj). Because of the assumptions about  (), we have that j(ri   x^i)j > (x^i ri)
and j(1  x^i   rj)j > j(ri   x^i)j because 1   x^i   rj < ri   x^i given that ri + rj > 1.
Therefore Wut(u (x^ut)) < 1. Utilitarian welfare is obviously larger (Wut  1) when the
social planner has the possibility to match both claims, i.e., when agents are unbiased as
shown in section 4.1. Self-serving bias is welfare detrimental since reference points that are
not compatible make unavoidable the fact that someone must be disappointed: if everyone
is ambitious, someone will be frustrated.
Consider now what happens if the social planner adopts the maxmin or the fair SWF.
As usual, the maxmin criterion selects the allocation for which the utility functions intersect
while the fair criterion selects the egalitarian allocation. Both these allocations surely fall
in the intermediate interval A. The following special case is particularly striking:
Proposition 5 If claimants have reference dependent preferences, are self-serving biased
and perfectly symmetric then x^mm = x^fa = argminxWut(u(x)) =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

.
Proof. If claimants are symmetric then r1 = r2 and the only feasible and e¢ cient allocation
that equalizes their utility is the egalitarian one. It follows that x^mm = x^fa =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

.
Symmetry also implies that
 
1
2 ;
1
2

is the unique allocation for which the FOCs of Wut(u(x))
are satised

@u1(x1)
@x1
= @u2(x2)@x2

and x1 + x2 = 1 holds. But being in the interval in which
both individual functions are convex thenWut(u(x)) is also convex such that
 
1
2 ;
1
2

identies
the minimum of the utilitarian SWF.
Therefore, when claimants are perfectly symmetric, the egalitarian allocation is sup-
ported by both the maxmin and the fair SWFs. Indeed, possibly also because of its unique-
ness with respect to the utilitarian solution (see Prop. 4) and ethical appeal (in line with
Aristotles celebrated prescription that equals should be treated equally), this is certainly
the most common solution implemented in reality. Still, Proposition 5 shows that, in the
case of reference dependent preferences and self-serving biased agents, such a choice implies
a high e¢ ciency cost. In fact, the egalitarian allocation happens to be the worst possible
outcome from a utilitarian point of view.
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Some of the results presented in this section easily generalize to the case in which the
two agents are endowed with heterogeneous gain-loss functions i(). In particular, the fair
criterion always selects the symmetric allocation while the maxmin criterion keeps selecting
an intermediate solution such that xi < ri for any i 2 f1; 2g. This can never happen if the
social planner adopts the utilitarian approach as x^uti  ri for one i 2 f1; 2g. Which agent
will get the more favorable allocation depends on the specic functional forms. In particular,
what matters is the relative slope of the i() functions in the domain of gains (better to
appreciate more the surplus xi  ri) as well as in the domain of losses (better to su¤er more
the loss ri   xi).
To sum up, the main result of this section is that, when claimants are characterized
by reference dependent preferences and they also display a self-serving bias, the optimal
allocations selected by the three SWFs do not generally coincide. This is an important
di¤erence with respect to the cases of inequity aversion (Section 3) and reference dependence
with no self-serving bias (Section 4). It implies a more decisive role for the social planner,
as his choice about which welfare criterion to follow leads to very di¤erent allocations of
the good. Moreover, it suggests the possibility that claimants may behave strategically. We
now briey discuss this issue.
4.2.1 Some strategic considerations
The basic formulation of our allocative problem did not present any strategic aspect: the
social planner considers individual preferences, and implements a certain allocation accord-
ing to the specic welfare criterion that he is following. The claimants have basically no
active role in the process. Still, the mere fact that a social welfare function is a function
of individualsutility functions suggests the possibility that agents may try to inuence the
nal allocation by strategically disguising their real preferences. In this section we show
how a common regularity (namely, the fact that the claims of agents involved in disputes
often appear to be exaggerated) is rationalized by a model in which claimants with refer-
ence dependent preferences strategically announce their reference point. Such a behavior
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also reveals claimantsrational beliefs about the social welfare criterion that the planner will
use.
Consider the already familiar case of two claimants having utility functions ui = xi +
(xi   ri) and focus on the maxmin criterion. We saw that a maxmin social planner aims
to equalize utilities so that, in the common case of biased individuals
 
ri >
1
2

, the selected
allocation certainly falls into the intermediate interval where xi < ri for any i 2 f1; 2g. More
precisely, the planner implements the allocation x^mm = (x^mm1 ; x^
mm
2 ) that solves x^
mm
1 +
(x^mm1   r1) = x^mm2 + (x^mm2   r2) subject to x^mm1 + x^mm2 = 1. We want to study the
e¤ects that ri has on x^mmi for any given rj . Focusing on agent 1, the last expression can be
rewritten as F (x^mm1 ; r1) = 2x^
mm
1 +(x^
mm
1  r1) (1 x^mm1  r2) 1 = 0. This is an implicit
function that satises the assumptions of the implicit-function theorem. In fact, property
A2 of the gain-loss function () (see page 11) ensures that partial derivatives @F (x^mm1 ;r1)@x^mm1
and @F (x^
mm
1 ;r1)
@r1
are continuous and that @F (x^
mm
1 ;r1)
@x^mm1
6= 0 for any x1 < r1.
By totally di¤erentiating F (x^mm1 ; r1) one gets
@(x^mm1  r1)
@r1
+

2 +
@(x^mm1  r1)
@x^mm1
  @(1 x^mm1  r2)@x^mm1

@x^mm1
@r1
= 0
such that @x^
mm
1
@r1
can be expressed as
@x^mm1
@r1
=  
@(x^mm1  r1)
@r1
2+
@(x^mm1  r1)
@x^mm1
  @(1 x^
mm
1  r2)
@x^mm1
where the numerator of the ratio is negative (by A1) while the denominator is positive; in
particular, the second term is positive (again by A1) while the third one is negative given
that x^mm2 decreases as x^
mm
1 increases. It follows that
@x^mm1
@r1
> 0. Therefore an agent, even
though he anticipates that he will get xi < ri, still should purposely inate his (possibly
already biased) claim ri.13
Many are the real-life situations in which conicting interests have to be settled by
some kind of an authority and players have the possibility to ex-ante declare what they are
13The Nash equilibrium is such that both players announce ri = 1 and the social planner implements
x^mm =
 
1
2
; 1
2

. Such a situation resembles the famous problem of King Solomon who suggested to split a
baby in half in front of two women that were both claiming to be his mother.
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expecting to get: divorces, reimbursements for damages, bargaining, political negotiations,
lobbying. In all of these cases it is common to observe agents asking for extremely high
claims. The above analysis shows that such a behavior is rational when the agents believe
that the planner is going to implement an intermediate allocation such as the maxmin
one where the nal allocation is positively anchored to the initial claim.14 Indeed, as it
has already been noted, intermediate allocations appear to be the most common solutions
implemented in reality.
4.2.2 A digression on paternalism
The study of the allocation problem in the case of self-serving biased agents with reference
dependent preferences raises another interesting issue which, this time, has to do with the
behavior of the social planner. More precisely, what should be the role of a benevolent
planner in front of biased individuals? Shall the planner behave in a paternalistic way and
try to debias the claimants? Or shall he simply maximize welfare, taking agentsbiased
preferences as given?
In general, a rm principle of traditional welfare analysis is that policies should not be
paternalistic, i.e., the social planner/government should not substitute the preferences of the
individuals with his own. Indeed, such a principle is hardly criticizable under the assumption
that agents are fully rational. Still, recent behavioral contributions show that the alterna-
tive assumption of limited rationality is often more realistic, as individualspreferences are
characterized by biases and inconsistencies and their choices are plagued by mistakes. In
such a situation the active intervention of a more rational social planner can improve welfare
without being too distortive. Camerer (1999, p. 10577) provides a clear example for such
an approach:
Relaxing rationality assumptions therefore permits reasoned argument about how people can
be helped. For example, if people weight the future hyperbolically rather than exponentially,
14This would not be the case with the fair SWF, which selects an intermediate allocation (the symmetric
one) that does not depend on ri. For what concerns utilitarian welfare, the sign of
@x^uti
@ri
cannot be univocally
assessed, as we saw (Proposition 4) that the solution is often not unique.
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they will impulsively buy goods they will soon regret having bought. A good policy to help
those who weight the future hyperbolically is a mandatory cooling o¤ period that permits
hotconsumers to renege on purchase decisions for a short period of time, such as 3 days.
(Many states have such policies). Cooling-o¤ policies exemplify conservative paternalism
- they will do much good for people who act impulsively and cause very little harm (an
unnecessary 3-day wait) for those who do not act impulsively; thus, even conservatives who
resist state intervention should nd them appealing.
Indeed, some forms of such a conservative or asymmetric paternalism have been
recently advocated in many inuential papers that study the social welfare implications
of behavioral models (see for example Camerer et al., 2003, Gruber and Koszegi, 2004,
ODonoghue and Rabin, 2006). In line with the quotation above, these papers show that
lifetime welfare of biased consumers can be larger when their behavior is constrained by
some ad-hoc policies (for instance, taxes on the consumption of addictive goods). Moreover,
unbiased consumers are shown to su¤er very little from the introduction of such policies; this
kind of governments intervention appears to be welfare improving even if the proportion of
biased individuals is small.
These arguments are convincing but do not apply to the context of our simple one-period
allocative problem in which agents characterized by reference dependent preferences su¤er
from a self-serving bias. In fact, in this case, welfare is surely larger when the planner takes
agentsbiases as given. An alternative scenario would be one of a repeated version of the
one shot problem: in such a situation a planner that is interested in long term or average
welfare can nd it optimal to initially disappoint biased claimants with the goal of moving
their reference point from a biased one (ri > 1N ) to an unbiased one (ri =
1
N ). Our analysis
showed in fact that, under all three SWF specications, the welfare associated with the
optimal allocation is usually larger in the case of unbiased claimants (see Section 4.1) than
in the case of biased ones (see Section 4.2). The time horizon of the social planner is then
crucial in order to justify or not the adoption of a paternalistic approach.15
15As an example, consider the situation of a self-serving biased baby who thinks he deserves to watch
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5 Conclusion
We investigated the social welfare implications that some important classes of behavioral
preferences have on the classical welfare problem of allocating a scarce resource among a nite
number of claimants. In particular we considered the cases of inequity aversion preferences
and reference dependent preferences. In the latter case we also studied the impact of agents
displaying a self-serving bias when setting their reference points.
The analysis showed that optimal allocations are often remarkably di¤erent with respect
to the traditional rational preferences case. It follows that the optimal policies that a
social planner should implement are also di¤erent. Moreover, despite having used welfare
criteria that are based on the concept of individualsutility, some of the results of the paper
have some strong positive, and not just normative, implications. For instance, we showed
that in the case of inequity averse individuals it is usually not necessary for the planner to
exactly know agentsutility functions, as the optimal allocation remains the same for a wide
range of individualsparameters as well as for di¤erent welfare specications. In the case
of reference dependent preferences, we showed how the presence of biased individuals gives
rise to a severe trade-o¤ between e¢ cient versus equitable allocation and how and why this
trade-o¤ is usually solved in favor of equitability. In talking about the positive aspects of
the analysis, an obvious question is how to decide which are the relevant preferences that
have to be assumed in di¤erent contexts. The specic problem under study may possibly
indicate the solution: a planner who has to divide a resource among a group of friends may
safely assume inequity aversion. At the opposite, we mentioned the case of a couple facing a
rough divorce as an example where reference dependent preferences and self-serving biases
are likely to play a role.
This study could certainly be extended in many ways. For instance, we restricted the
analysis to cases of inequity aversion and reference dependent preferences because we think
TV till 10 pm while, given his age and habits, he should actually go to sleep at 9 pm. A parent who cares
about the long-run health and balance of her child should override the babys biases and send him to sleep
at 9 pm. However, a baby-sitter who simply wants to minimize the babys crying may nd it optimal to
accommodate his request.
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these to be the families of preferences more relevant in the context of our allocative prob-
lem. Still, the impact of other kinds of behavioral preferences could be analyzed in slightly
di¤erent problems. For instance, models of reciprocity can matter if claimants have the
possibility to reward or punish the planner while hyperbolic discounting can play a role if
the game is repeated over time. Additionally, a mixture of various kinds of preferences could
be allowed. Finally, at a more general level, another direction to go would be to perform a
welfare analysis that is based on ordinal preference relations rather than on cardinal utility
functions.
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, we feel that our analysis captures the main
ingredients of many real-life allocative problems ranging from litigations to political lobbying,
from impasses in bargaining to divorces and that, more generally, it contributes to the recent
literature about the public-policy implications of research in behavioral economics.
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